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\\ITHINT THE last decade the origins of the action of trespass on the
case have become a controversial subject arousing interest among lawyers
and historians as well as among those more specialized hybrids, legal
historians. At the beginning of this century no one questioned the theory
of the origins of the action proposed by Ames, Holmes, Holdsworth,
Salmond and others.' It was generally believed by these writers that
the action of trespass on the case was a direct derivative from the well
known in consimili casu clause of Edward I's Statute of 1285, West-
minster II, chapter 24. Behind this belief was the support of older
writers, Chitty, Reeves, Stephen and Blackstone,2 confirming beyond
doubt the relationship between the action of case and Westminster II.
In the course of the last thirty years, however, attention has been
directed to flaws in the generally accepted theory of the origin of case.
The objections were strongly voiced several years ago by Mr. Theodore
F. T. Plucknett, who concluded from his study that the background,
content and results of the Statute of Westminster II, and particularly of
the in consimili casu clause, indicated that the action of case had no
connection with the Statute.'
There are two sides to the present controversy: one is represented by
Mr. Plucknett himself; the other is represented by Sir William Holds-
worth4 and his associate at Oxford, Mr. P. A. Landon.5 In support
I Ph.D., Yale University, 1936. This article is part of a dissertation presented for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University, June, 1936.
1. The opinion of Holmes was that "the famous statute of 13 EDWARD I, c. 24,
authorized the office from which the old writs issued to frame new ones in cases simi-
lar in principle to those for which writs were found, and requiring like remedy, but
not exactly falling within the scope of the writs already in use. Thus writs of trespass
on the case began to make their appearance; that is, writs stating a ground of complaint
analogous to a trespass, but not quite amounting to a trespass as it had been sued for
in the older precedents." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 274-75. See AMES, LEc-
TURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 442; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1923)
365; MAITLAND, EQUITY AND TIE FORMS OF ACTION (1909) 345-46; SALMOND, LAW OF
TORTS (8th ed. 1934) 4, n. q.; 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 249;
SUTTON, PERSONAL ACTIONS AT COMMON LAW (1929) 24 et seq.
2. 3 BL. Com.mn. *122; 4 id. at *442; 1 CHITTY, PLEADING *95-96; 3 REEvEs, His-
TORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1787) 89; STEPHEN, PLEADING *15-16.
3. Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster 11 (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 778;
see also Plucknett, Case and Westminster II (1936) 52 L. Q. REv. 220.
4. Note (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 334.
5. Landon, The Action on the Case and the Statute of Westminster II (1936)
52 L. Q. REv. 68.
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of their Traditionalist' position, the latter two have analyzed the gen-
erally accepted theory and have reduced it to an apparently logical and
watertight conception of the development of the action on the case:7
(1) The name of the action on the case is a derivative of the phrase
"on the case" used to describe a writ suited to the plaintiff's "case."'
(2) These writs "on the case," described by Bracton as brevia magis-
tralia, existed in the common law at least as early as the thirteenth cen-
tury. (3) The power to issue these writs, temporarily curtailed by the
Provisions of Oxford in 1259,' was restored and strengthened by the
in consinili casu clause of the Statute of Westminster II. (4) Con-
sequently, after 1285 the Chancery developed new writs "on the case,"
chief among which was the writ of trespass on the case. (5) Therefore,
though writs "on the case" antedated the Statute of Westminster II,
it is correct to say that the writ of "trespass on the case" was a direct
product of the in consimili casai clause of that Statute.
The aimunciation of the Traditionalist theory was provoked by 2Mr.
Plucknett's study of Westminster II and its relation to case. Mr. Plucknett
had stated"° (1) that the Statute in part and as a whole can be properly
6. The title is Landon's own. Landon distinguishes between three historical
schools: Plucknett's group; a Modern group, represented by Ames, Holmes, Sutton
and others, which has engrafted upon a basically sound idea some fallacious assump-
tions; and his own Traditionalist group. The Traditionalists recognize the errors of the
Modern group, but hold to the same general conception of the origin of case. As Lan-
don puts it, the Traditionalist theory of Blackstone, Reeves, and Sterhen has been sancti-
fied by the leading lawyers for so many centuries that criticism of it is ridiculous.
7. Landon, loc. cit. supra note 5.
8. It is on this first point, according to Landon, that the Modern group and the
Traditionalists split. The Modern group says that the name of the action of trespass
on the case came from the phrase "in consinli casC" in the Statute of Westminster II,
c. 24. Trespass on the case is "so called because the writ was issued in consnili casu
cadente . . . (in analogous circumstances and falling under the same law and requir-
ing the same remedy) as trespass." SALmOxI, loc. cit. supra note 1; cf. Sutrro.N, loc. ci.
supra note 1. With good reason Landon and the Traditionalists believe that the name
of the action on the case came from the form of the writ and had nothing to do with
the in consinili casa of the Statute. By overlooking this difference between the Mod-
era group and the Traditionalists, Plucknett has confused the real issue of the origin
of the action as a whole. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century all writers be-
lieved that the name of the action signified that it was begun by a species of writ which
included all the matter of the case. See, e.q., CO'UELL. INrMRPEanEr (1637) f. B 1 b;
JACOB, LAW DIcTIoNArzy (2d ed. 1809) f. D; RASTELL, TrErEs rE LA LEY (1742) 17.
Blackstone's definition, borrowed from Lambard, is that a writ of case gives the suitor
"ready relief, according to the exigency of his business, and adapted to the specialty.,
reason and equity of his very case;" for a wrong or injury unaccompanied by force
"there is a remedy in damages by a special action of trespass upon the case . . . so
called because the plaintiff's whole case or cause of complaint is set forth at length in the
original writ.' 3 Bi. Comm. *122.
9. 1259, 23 HEN. III.
10. Plucknett, loc. cit. supro note 3, 31 COL. L REV.
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understood only when considered in its historical setting; (2) that this
consideration leads to the belief that the in conshnili casit clause was
intended not to increase the writ-issuing power of the Chancery, but
to provide machinery for the reference to Parliament of disputed peti-
tions for writs, as a last recourse beyond the Chancery itself; (3) that
the writs resulting from the in consintili casit clause are few and definite,
the writ of entry in consimili casu, the writ of ravishment of ward for
socage tenure, and possibly a few others mentioned in the Register of
WVrits; (4) that each writ unquestionably derived from chapter 24 con-
cerns real property, while case applied to real property only late in its de-
velopment; (5) that the Year Books mention no connection between the
Statute and case; and (6) that the first suggestion of a connection be-
tween the two was made by William Lambard in the Archeion," whence
Blackstone borrowed the idea and popularized it. Plucknett's conclusion
is that historically the action on the case could not have come from the
Statute of \Vestminster II, that no one believed hi the origin of the
action in the Statute until at least the beginning of the seventeenth
century, and that the theory was not generally credited until the end of
the eighteenth century, when Blackstone's sponsorship provided the pres-
tige on which the belief has lived ever since. -12
Plucknett's attack on the generally accepted theory of the origin of
case is entirely destructive; his sole aim is to show that the action prob-
ably did not come from the statute. 3 The Traditionalists, on the other
hand, emphasize their conception of the way in which case originated
-a positive theory of the course of events- with such vigor that they
overlook or minimize the contradictory information brought out by
Plucknett. There are certain difficulties that preclude unqualified accept-
ance of the Plucknett view,' 4 especially because it offers no substitute
for the Traditionalist theory; and conversely, the Traditionalist theory
11. Lambard wrote the ARCHESON about 1591, but it was not published until 1635.
For the statement on case and the Statute of Westminster II see LAMBARD, ARcHFroN
(1635) 61-62.
12. Plucknett could have made his point even more strongly by indicating that it
was Blackstone who first mentioned the in consimili casu clause in connection with the
action on the case. 3 BL. Commss. *52. Lambard quoted a few lines of the Statute, from
the first and possibly the twenty-fourth chapters [LAMBARD, ARCHEION (1635) 61], but
he did not cite the in consinili casu clause. It was Blackstone who first introduced
that bit of the Traditionalist theory some five hundred years after the appearance of
the action.
13. Remarks suggestive of the origins of the action on the case are found in his
CONcISE HISTORY OF THE CoiiON LAW (2d ed. 1936) 335, 414-16.
14. Plucknett's treatment of the meaning and significance of the Provisions of
Oxford [1259, 43 HEN. III; STUBBS, SELEc'r CHARTERS (9th ed. 1913) 378] is not uni-
versally acceptable; and his assumption that all modem writers believe that the name
of the action on the case came from the in consimili casu clause is probably an over-
statement.
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is weakened considerably by its failure to account for some of the facts
stressed by Plucknett.Y;
The situation at the present time is, therefore, that each of the parties
to this controversy stoutly maintains his own position, the question is
not settled, and most of those who might be interested in a resolution
of the dispute continue to think and teach that case came from the in
conshiili casu clause. The purpose of the present paper is constructive
rather than controversial. The subject is so obscure that it may never
be possible to establish the origins of the action of trespass on the case
by an offer of historically incontrovertible evidence. But the evidence
that now exists indicates first that the action of case did not come from
the Statute of Westminster II, and second that the action was a gradual
and evolutionary common law development, in the late fourteenth and
the fifteenth centuries, out of the older action of trespass Ti et armis.
I. ACTION ON THE CASE AND THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER II
That the action of trespass on the case did not develop from the Stat-
ute of Westminster II is indicated by a study of the Statute in the light
of the condition of the judiciary in the thirteenth century."0 It has been
commonly supposed that the Statute set up a machinery for the issue
of new writs by the Chancery, and that the best known product of that
machinery was the writ of trespass on the case. If it is true that the
Statute did establish maclhinery by which the writ of trespass on the
case was formulated, then it would not be too much to say that the
action came from the Statute, even though it appeared long after the
Statute had been enacted. The connection between the action and the
Statute is much less clear, however, if the machinery set up by the
Statute was not for the issuance of new writs, or if there is no indi-
15. Landon has yet to prove that the popularization of the Traditionalist theory of
the origin of case was not the work of Blackstone, who took it from Lambard. And
the Traditionalist view that the action on the case existed in the thirteenth century,
before 1285, lacks conviction because of their apparent ignorance of recent wor: on the
development of the action of trespass in the thirteenth century. See Woudbine. The
Origins of the Action of Trespass (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 799, (1925) 34 YAxZ L. J.
343.
16. Plucknett has made a rather exhaustive study of the Statute itself in its his-
torical background [Plucknett, loc. cit. supra note 3, 31 Co,- L Rev.], but it seems
advisable to reconsider the matter. Landon's article [Landon, loc. cit. supra note 51.
which has appeared since Plucknett's. has raised some new questions (notably that of
the brevia inagistralia) which Plucknett did not discuss. And I do not entirely agree
with some of Plucknett's conclusions concerning the thirteenth century lacl:.round.
especially concerning the effect of the Provisiuns of Oxford [Plucknett, supra nute 3.
31 CoL. L. RE%. at 793-94]. But Plucknett's statement that "the actian of cave is un-
related to the statute," is still acceptable. Plucknett, sispra note 3. 31 C,,. L REv. at
783.
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cation that the writ of case was in fact developed in accordance with
that machinery. The problem is reduced, therefore, to deciding whether
the statute created a chancery procedure for issuing new writs or for
issuing writs like Bracton's brezvia magistralia of the early thirteenth
century,17 and to deciding whether there is any evidence that the writ
of case was the result of the chancery procedure established.
A determination of the effect of chapter 24 of the Statute of 1285
on the issuing of writs by the Chancery depends in part upon the stated
purpose of the chapter: "In cases in which a writ is granted in
the Chancery because of the act of someone, from henceforth the
plaintiffs shall not leave the King's court without a remedy because the
tenement has been transferred from one to another. . . . "s The
chapter proceeds to give three examples of the extended remedies: the
assize of nuisance, which thereafter could be brought against the alienee
as well as against the levyor and alienor of a tenement upon which a
nuisance had been levied ;1" the quod perinittat, which thereafter could
be used by a parson against the disseisor or his heir to recover common
of pasture lost by his predecessor, just as before the Statute the parson's
predecessor could have recovered by a writ of novel disseisin; ° and the
assize ittrmn, which was extended to try the question of right between
two churches where the tenement in dispute had been alienated from one
church to another. 2' Apparently chapter 24 gave three specific examples
of forms of writs which henceforth were to be issued by the Chancery
under circumstances slightly variant from those in which they had pre-
viously been issued. This was in accordance with the principle stated in
17. See Landon, supra note 5, at 74-75.
18. "In casibus quibus conceditur breve in Cancellaria de facto alicuis decetero
non rccedant querentes a curia Regis sine remcedio, pro eo quad tenementum transfertur
de uno in aliunm . . ." Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 EDW. I. c. 24; see text in
1 STATUTES OF THE REALM (1810) 83 and in Plucknett, supra note 3, 31 COL. L. REV.
at 789. The Statute continues: " . . . ct in registro de Cancellaria non est inventuin ali-
quwd breve in illo casu spcciale, etc."
19. Statute of Westminster II, c. 24; see REGISMRUm BREVIUM (1687) f. 198, where
there is a regula stating that the writ came from the Statute.
20. Ibid.; see RaIsTmtui BREVIUM (1687) f. 155b.
21. Ibid. Before the Statute the assize lay to inquire whether a tenement was a lay
fee or the free alms of a church. Ibid.; see REGISTRUm BREVIUM (1687) f. 32b. On the
character and development of this curious remedy which began as an assize to determine
jurisdiction and ended as the parson's writ of right see Kimball, The Judicial Aspects
of Frank Alinoign Tenure (1932) 47 ENG. HIST. REV. 1; Kimball, Tenure int Frank
Alnoign and Secular Services (1928) 43 ENa. HisT. REV. 341; Thorne, The Assiae
Utrum and Canon Law in England (1933) 33 CoL. L. REV. 428. According to Pollock
and Maitland, the Statute of Westminster II removed the last traces of the early nature
of the action. 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1905) 250; see
also GLANVILL, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus REGNM ANGLIAE (Woodbine ed. 1932)
286 (note on c. 23).
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the chapter that he who would hitherto have been deprived of a remedy
because of the transference of the tenement should henceforth have a
remedy despite that alienation. None of the remedies given was new;
each was a well known form of writ, with a change only in the parties
to the suit.
A similar but more general provision for the extension of familiar
remedies to slightly varying cases .is found in the last paragraph of the
twenty-fourth chapter, containing the in consimili casu clause:
"And whenever henceforth, it shall happen in the Chancery that
in one case a writ is found and in a like case falling under the same
law and requiring a like remedy [no writ is found], then the clerks
of the Chancery shall agree in making the writ, or they may adjourn
the plaintiffs until the next parliament, and let them write the cases
in which they cannot agree and refer them to the next parliament,
and let the writ be made with the consent of the wise men of the
law; and from henceforth, let it not happen that the court any
longer fail complainants seeking justice."2
The actual meaning of this paragraph can be determined only by a
consideration of the rest of the Statute. The purpose of the Statute
of Westminster II was to fill the gaps in the common law by creating
legal remedies for certain cases then unprovided for by common or
statute law. This purpose was carried out by three types of provisions:
first, by the provisions for the better enforcement of previously created
statutory remedies, such as the writ of cessavit given by the Statute of
Gloucester;24 second, by the provision for entirely new remedies, such
as the famous writ of fornedon and third, by the provision for the
formulation of similar writs for similar cases both at that time and
in the future. This third objective was achieved in the twenty-fourth
chapter, through the forms of writs there rehearsed and through the
definition in the last paragraph of the way in which these similar forms
of writs could be obtained.
22. "Et quocienscanque, decetero evencrit in Cancellaria quad in uno cans repcriiur
breve, et in consimili cast cadente sub eodcm jurc ct smili indigente rcmcdio, ca.-
cordent clerici de Cancellaria in brevA faciendo, vol attcrminert querentes in proximo
parleamento, et scribant casus in qtdbus concordare non posswint. ct refcrant cos ad proxi-
munum paricamentum, et do couscisu jurispcritorum fiat brev; nc contingat dececiro qu d
curia din deficiat querentibus in jiusticia pcrquirenda." Statute of Westminster II, c. 24.
23. Id. at Preamble and c. 50; 1 STATUrES OF Tn REim.,s (110) 71, 95; see Amrs,
loc. cit. supra note 1. Twenty-eight chapters of the Statute are concerned with real
property actions; the others deal with crimes, debt, process, account, commissioning of
justices, delivery and return of writs by sheriffs, and so forth.
24. Id. at c. 21; Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Enw. I, c. 4; 1 STArUrS o THE
REALu (1810) 48. See Pluckmett, supra note 3, 31 CoL L. RE,. at 790.
25. Statute of Westminster II, c. 1.
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This attempt in 1285 to supply the deficiencies in the common law
would hardly have been necessary fifty years earlier. During the first
half of the thirteenth century the common law of England was expand-
ing rapidly in all directions,2" not through statutory enactment, but
through the cooperation of the King's courts and the Chancery in try-
ing to grant a remedy for almost every wrong presented for their con-
sideration. 2T There were. perhaps, some political reasons for this expan-
sion of the law. The King's courts were trying to draw to themselves
the major portion of the judicial business of the realm in order to sup-
plant the local and feudal courts. 28 To effect this end they were willing
to give a remedy to almost any complainant who appeared before them.20
The Chancery, also eager to enhance the power of the King and the
central government which it represented, aided and abetted the courts
by establishing writs that enabled complainants to get their cases into
the courts."o
A second reason for the flexibility of the forms of action in the early
thirteenth century lies in the principle of damages, so important in
English law. which had just been introduced through the medium of
the assize of novel disseisin and was gradually spreading to the other
forms of action."1 Until after 1250 these actions for damages took
no one fixed form, but were brought usually by a complaint in the form
of a quare writ out of the Chancery.32 The range and variation as well
26. This growth becomes evident in comparing the highly developed law of BaAc-
To.N-s DE LEGIBcS with the writs in Glanvill's work and in the early IRIsH REGISTER OF
WRITS; the latter are primarily basic writs, e.g., the writ of right, the assizes of novel
disseisin and mort d'ancestor, the action of debt, and certain criminal actions. See
Maitland, The History of the Register of Oriqinal Writs (1889) 3 HARV. L. REv. 97,
108 rt seq.; 2 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS (1911) 110, 126 et seq.
27. 1 BRACTON's NOTE BOOK (Maitland ed. 1887) 1-7. The Provisions of Merton,
1236, 20 HEN. III, represent the only early statute of any importance.
28. 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1905) 195-97.
29. 1 BRACTON's NOTE BOOK (Maitland ed. 1887) 1-7.
30. For a description of the freedom of the Chancery in issuing writs before 1259
see BRACTON, Da LEGmBus f. 414b.
31. Woodbine, supra note 15, 33 YALE L. J. at 802.
32. It is possible that these formless quare actions were synonymous with the mid-
thirteenth century brezia magistralia which Landon claims were "actions on the case."
Landon, supra note 5, at 74. Everything that is known of the brevia inagistralia is in a
section from Bracton's treatise describing the issue of writs by the Chancery. BRACTON,
DE LEGIUS f. 413 b; see DODERIDCE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER (1631) 45; 2 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENXGLISH LAW (1923) 245: 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW (1905) 194, n. 1; Landon, supra note 5, at 73; Plucknett, supra note 3, at 793.
The brevia iagstralia here presented were contrasted with the brevia formata because
the form of the latter was fixed by usage and could be varied only by the consent of the
"common council of the whole realm." These brezia formata, we know, were writs
of right, dower, and debt, and assizes of novel disseisin-old and established writs of
course. On the other hand, the brevia magistralia, like the quare actions, were flexible,
[Vol. 46: 11421148
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as the frequency of these quare actions, can be seen in the cases in
Bracton's Note Book.' In classifying the forms of action appearing in
the Note Book, Maitland devoted an entire section to "miscellaneous
proceedings," the majority of which were quare actions of sonic ind;
and another section to trespass cases, most of which really were not
fully developed as trespass but were quare actions evolving towards
trespass.
By the latter part of the thirteenth century, the nature of the common
law had been changed by the emergence of the formalized action of
trespass from these hybrid quare actions and by the establishment of
the King's courts as the controlling judiciary of the kingdom. Secure
in their position, the central courts turned their attention to systematiz-
ing and formalizing the lav they applied."' The Chancery, pervaded by
the same spirit and repressed by the Provisions of Oxford3 5 a result
designed to suit the situation at hand; and during the time of Bracton, before 1259,
these variant writs could be issued without the specific assent of the "common council."
BRACToN, DE Laimus f. 414b.
33. 1 BRAcroN's NOTE Boor (Maitland ed. 1887) 184-186 (Group VIII). Of course,
not all of these are quare actions. See id. at 186, under Trespass. There are other qvarc
actions in 1 SELEcr Civ PLEAS (Selden Society 1890). Landon is justified in saying
that in their formlessness and adaptability actions in the nature of the qfarc actions
or of actions begun by Bracton's brezia inagistralia were similar to the later actions
on the case. But by his failure to take into account Voodbine's research into the origins
of the action of trespass [Woodbine, loc. cit. supra note 15], he misses Woodbine's point
that some of the quare actions, and presumably the brv'f maqistralia, represented
actions in the transitional stage, after the middle of the thirteenth century, before the
emergence of the action of trespass. Landon, following Am's and Rigg, appears to
believe that trespass was a well established action Iefore the time of Bracton, and
therefore is unable to understand the qure actions and other formless actions as fore-
runners of trespass itself, not of trespass on the case. Landon, sttra note 5, at 75, n. 36;
see Rigg's edition of the SELFCr PMAs oF THE EXCHE'Ur OF THE Jnws (Selden So-
ciety 1902) ; Am.Es, LEcruREs ox LErAL HISTORy (1913) 44; 2 Hoe.oswoavis, Hrs'ryav o;
ENGLISH LAW (1923) 364.
34. The conservatism of the judiciary did not stop at denying an action to private
litigants; on at least two occasions the courts threw out writs of quo Urranlo brought
by Edward I. PLACITA DE QUo ,,ARRAz.TO TrEiRuBtUs (1818) (31., 6,:; cee 1 Roium
PARLIA&ENTORUM' (1767) 52, where Edward I complained of having no writ. The re-
sult was the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Eow. I. The same spirit is demonstrated in
the early Year Books: every new or unusual form of writ had to h,2 elaborately (I-
fended and justified by the plaintiff, frequently without avail. E.q., Adam v. Waltham.
Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. 1, [R.S.] 320 (1294) ; Abbot of C. v. Earl of Warren, Y. B. 21 &
22 Edw. I, [RS.] 526 (1294); Tauney v. St. Omers, Y. B. Trin. 32 & 33 Ehv. 1,
[R.S.] 282 (1304); St. Michael v. Beauchamp, Y. B. Hil. 33 & 35 Edw. I, [R.S.] 426
(1307).
35. 1259, 43 HEN. III. The bearing of the Provisions of Oxford upon this contro-
versy has been much disputed. But it seems that the provisious concerning the chan-
cellor restricted his power considerably, particularly in the issue of extraordinary write
such as the brevia inagistralia or quare writs. Provisions of O.Xford 14 Am.AER-s Btr. -
TONENSES (1684) 446-453: STUBBS, SELECT CHARTS (9th ed. 1913) F1- 3]. As we
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of the temporarily successful opposition of the Barons to the growing
centralized power of the King - ceased granting writs not already es-
tablished in their registers in a set form. Out of the quare actions, as
formless actions for damages in general, emerged the specialized writ
of trespass; but the writ of trespass granted redress for injury done
1y direct force, and did not apply to other types of injuries. Thus a
spirit of conservatism settled upon the courts and upon the Chancery,
producing an ossification of the system of writs, which was to change
little except by statute for several hundred years.
That this ossification had set in by the year 1285 is indicated by the
quocicuscunque clause in which Edward urges the use of new and variant
remedies." The Statute of Westminster II would have been an anomaly
in the "golden age of the forms of action," as Pollock and Maitland had
called the earlier thirteenth century.3 But by 1285 this Statute was
needed to counteract the formalism and conservatism of the Chancery
and of the courts. The provisions of chapter 24 and of the rest of the
Statute were attempts by Edward to provide remedies for otherwise
remediless plaintiffs. And the in consimnili casu clause was intended to
authorize a petition to Parliament for variant forms of writs should
the chancery clerks and the "wise men" of the realm fail to grant the
necessary writs."' These writs, however, were to be secured only for
a "like case falling under the same law and requiring a like remedy"
to a writ already in existence." It would be safe to assume, did the
Year Books not prove the point conclusively, that the reactionaries in
the Chancery and in the courts would place a very strict interpretation
upon the degree of "similarity" required in such situations.
It seems, therefore, that the Traditionalist position that the chapter
restored to the Chancery the power to issue brevia magistralia denied to
it by the Provisions of Oxford"0 is quite untenable in the light of the
know from Bracton. prior to 1259 the consent of the magnates was not necessary for
the issue of an unusual writ if they did not expressly dissent. BRACTON, DE LEosnUs
f. 414b. But after the Provisions of Oxford the King's authorization was not enough
to justify the Chancellor in establishing a new form of writ.
36. See note 22, supra.
37. 2 POLLOCK AND M AITLANP. HiSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1905) 564.
38. Many early fourteenth century petitions to Parliament are preserved in the
printed Rolls of Parliament; some are clearly of the type suggested by the Statute-
petitions seeking a method for the judicial redress of grievances, e.g., the petition made
by Agnes Frowyk. Other petitions were less judicial or more extraordinary in nature.
Frowyk v. Leukenore, I ROTeIu PARLIAM.NTORUM [1767] 278, no. 27 (1308-1309). See
notes 50, 120, infra.
39. Several passages in Bracton show that the phrase "in consimili casu" was used
in the thirteenth century in a purely descriptive manner to mean "in a like situation,"
with no suggestion of the technical meaning that might be connected with the "case"
of action "on the case." BRAcrox, DE LEGlBUS f. 370, f. 398.
40. Landon, supra note 5, at 75.
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Statute's background. The brevia inagistralia were a phenomenon of
the "golden age of the forms of action," and by 1285 that age had
passed away forever. Edward I probably could not have revived it if
he had wished. And the Statute of 1285 bears no mark of such a desire
on Edward's part. It did not provide for the issuance of formless writs
like the old quare actions and like the later writs of case; it merely pro-
vided, as far as we are interested here, for the issuance of variant forms
of regularly established writs, and, where the Chancery would not ac-
commodate the petitioner, for the reference of the petition to Parlia-
ment. In the Chancery and, beyond it, in Parliament there still rested
the discretion to decide what variant forms of writs were to be granted;
these bodies had the power to interpret the provisions of the Statute;
and the courts retained the prerogative of refusing to uphold the forms
of variant writs granted by the Chancery or by Parliament.
The Traditionalist position is further weakened by the strict con-
struction applied by the Chancery and the courts to the in consinili casu
clause in the Statute of Westminster II. As far as is known, only two
writs41 were actually framed under the provisions of the in consimnli
casu clause, the writ of entry in consintili casu42 and the writ of ravish-
ment of ward for socage tenure.43 The former writ, an extension of the
writ of entry in casu proviso given by the Statute of Gloucester," was
41. The Year Book cases [see note 34, supra] concern variant forms of writs justi-
fied by the plaintiffs in each instance as derived from the Statute of Westminster II,
though not necessarily from c. 24. But none of these writs seem to have been then estab-
lished. The Register also contains several writs connected with the Statute by inar-
ginalia. For example: "'Regula: Islud brcz'c non dalur per statutun, sod palest salzari
per staluturn IF. secundi, cap. 2.1 in consinili casi etc." REarsrntut BnEvium (1637)
f. 199b (writ of quod perinittat). This statement does not necessarily imply that the
writ was framed with the Statute in mind. Parties often referred to statutes in order
to confuse their opponents.
42. REGisTRum BREvIuM (1687) f. 236, 236b.
43. RErISTRUM BREVIUM (1687) f. 161b, 162.
44. 1278, 6 EDw. I, c. 7. Prior to the Statute of Gloucester there had existed a
writ of entry ad communcm legen, which allowed the reversioner to recover after the
death of a tenant for life, in dower, or by the curtesy, when the tenant had conveyed.
The limitation of actions during the tenant's lifetime was something of a hardship,
however, because if the tenant for life died long after the alienation, recovery by the
reversioner would be more difficult. In the Statute of Gloucester, c. 7 provided that the
reversioner after a tenant in dower might recover during the life of the doweress
(where she alienated in fee, in tail, or for life) by a writ of entry in casts proviso, a
writ which always recited the Statute. Until 1310 the reversioner still could not recover
during the life of a tenant for life or by the curtesy, if the tenant conveyed; in that
year there appeared the writ of entry it consimili casu--or, as the Year Book says,
"per fonnain statuti in casu consimili provsi." On the writs of entry see Boorit. RA.
ActioNs (1808) 197-99; 3 Hot~swonra, HisTory or ENGLISix LAw (1923) 19; 2 PoL-
LOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1905) 69, n. 2; cf. Jehu Webb's Case,
8 Co. Rep. 45b, 46a (1609).
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developed through the collaboration of court and chancery officials- if
we may believe the story in the Year Book - in the two cases of 1310,
Devereux v. Tuchet4" and Stirkeland v. Brunolfshead.4" In the former,
an action brought by an infant remainderman for recovery during the
life of the alienor, a tenant for life, the writ granted by the Chancery
was abated in the court. The petitioner complained to the Chancery;
Bereford. C. J.. was called in to discuss the matter. Bereford said that
the writ was not maintainable by the Statute of Gloucester.
"Barneby [Bardelby, Master in Chancery]. The Statute of
Gloucester wills that. if women holding in dower alienate, the rever-
sioner shall at once have his recovery; and Westminster the Second
wills that in consimili casu, etc.
"BEREFORD, C. J. Blessed be he who made that Statute. Make
the writ and we will maintain it." 47
And no more is heard of this case.
In Stirkeland v. Brunolfshead, an action brought by a reversioner to
recover immediately upon an alienation in fee by a tenant by the curtesy,
the writ was also abated and again Bereford, C. J., was called in for
consultation.
"Four days afterwards the Statute was considered in the presence
of BEREFORD, C. J. [and] Bardelby and Osgodby and other exam-
iners of the Chancery, and they amended the writ by this clause:
'in consimili casu provisi' [and then follows the orthodox form of
the writ of entry in consiinili casu].' ' 48
The writ of entry in consimili casu thereafter became a regular writ of
course, fixed in form.40 It appears from these statements that the writ
was a direct derivative of the Statute of Westminster II, chapter 24; but
only after strenuous argument was the court willing to consider the
various forms of a life estate sufficiently similar to come within the
meaning of the Statute.
45. Y. B. Hil. 3 Edw. II. [S. S.] 16 (1310).
46. Y. B. East. 3 Edw. II, [S. S.] 106 (1310).
47. Y. B. Hil. 3 Edw. II, [S. S.] 16, 19 (1310). For this form of the writ of entry
in consiMili casu see REGISTRUM BRE'IUM (1687) f. 236.
48. Y. B. East. 3 Edw. II, [S. S.] 106, 109 (1310). In abating the writ Bereford,
C. J., had said: "No writ is maintainable outside of the course of the common law
[and] 'by the form of the Statute' unless it be expressly given by the Statute. And
as to what you say about 'let the clerks of the Chancery agree,' that is to be under-
stood of writs in strange cases; but if your writ had not those words 'by the form of
the Statute,' it would have some colour and might be maintainable." Id. at 108.
49. Only two years after the introduction of the writ there occurs a case of a writ
of entry in consimili casu which is treated by the reporter as any other writ of course.
Glanville v. Paunton, Y. B. East. 5 Edw. II, [S. S.] 54 (1312).
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Although it is equally clear that the writ of ravishment of ward in
socage tenure was formed upon the basis of the in consimili casui clause,
it had a somewhat different history. One Agnes Frowyk, early in the
reign of Edward II, was procheyne arnie to an infant tenant by socage
who had been "ravished" and married against the will of both tenant and
next friend. Agnes petitioned Parliament for redress, knowing that
there was no remedy at law for the injury,"0 and was told to seek a
writ in Chancery formed according to her case. The Chancery accord-
ingly made the slight variation necessary in the established writ of
ravishment of ward for knight's service tenure, 5 and Agnes' case came
before the court. The defendants there objected to the form of the
writ, but the objections were not sustained by the court. 2
"Forasmuch as the Statute says 'that a plaintiff leave not the
Chancery without remedy,' and this writ has been given by the
common counsel of the Chancery according to the plaintiff's case,
and is not a writ founded upon the Statute concerning wardship,
we adjudge this writ good."
Like the writ of entry in consimili casut, this writ of ravishment of ward
was originally framed in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
of Westminster II, chapter 24,14 and became thereafter a writ of course.
Aside from these two writs, however, there seem to have been no
other writs developed specifically upon the basis of the in consinili casu
clause, although the Statute was more than once quoted in support of
50. See note 38, supra. The writ of ravishment of ward, a statutory remedy, orig-
inated in the Provisions of Merton, 1236, 20 HEN. 3, c. 6, and was made more useful
by the Statute of Westminster II, c. 35; but it applied only to tenants by knight's ser-
vice and not to tenants by socage.
51. For the two forms of the writ of ravishment of ward, one for tenants by chivalry
and another for tenants by socage, see REGisTRmt BtRvium (1687) f. 161b, 162; FvIZ-
IEEmRT, NEW NATuRA BRmViUmr 140.
52. Frowyk v. Leuekenore, Y. B. Hil. 2 & 3 Edw. II, [S. S.] 157 (1310). Counsel
objected to the form of the writ on the ground that it was not warranted by the
Statute nor by the common law, but was a new writ. As often happens, the report in the
Year Book and the plea roll record differ somewhat. "The report tells of a plea that
the boy was of full age, and of issue on that plea. The record shows a justification and
a reply de inuria." Id. at 163 (note by Maitland, editor).
53. Id. at 160. The report continues: "Her action for which her writ is conceived
depends [not on the marriage, but] on the ravishment. And the writ is given by the
Statute, which says 'let not the complainants [leave the Chancery without remedy'].
And it has been fashioned by the common counsel of the clerks of the Chancery.
[Wherefore the writ is good enough.]" Id. at 161.
54. Richard Chaunt et ux. v. Anon., Y. B. Mich. 1 Edw. III, f. 19, pl. 3 (1326) is
an early example of an action of ravishment of ward in socage tenure. See also Y. B.
9 Hen. VI, f. 61 (1430).
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an unusual writ."a In the case of Tauney v. St. Onters,"0 an action on
a writ of right, the plaintiff contended that the provisions in the Statute
of Gloucester that the heir should not be barred from his mother's in-
heritance by his father's deed had been extended by the in consintili
casn clause so that an heir would not be barred from his father's in-
heritance by his mothers fine. The court rejected this argument and
non-suited the plaintiff because lie was not within the Statute of Glouces-
ter without making any specific remarks concerning the in consimnili casu
clause. Three years later the court stated its position concisely. In
St. Michacl v. Bcauchamp, an action upon a writ of entry in casu
proviso, the plaintiff was a remainderman trying to recover immediately
after alienation by a tenant in tail. His counsel counted upon the in
consim ili casu clause as well as upon the Statute of Gloucester rehearsed
in the writ, but the court said: "HoWARD, J. The Statute of Gloucester
only says where the reversion, etc., and the Statute of Westminster II
directs that in a similar case there shall be a similar remedy; but these
two things. reversions and remainders, are not similar. ' ' Is
These cases are strongly suggestive of a conservative attitude on the
part of the Chancery and of the courts in their interpretation of the in
consinuili casu clause of chapter 24 of the Statute. The clause could not
be relied upon to support an unusual form of a writ unless the plaintiff
could show a striking similarity between the case for which the variant
form was needed and the one in which the writ of course was usually
granted. If the likeness had to be as close as that between the three
kinds of tenure for life, if it had to be more apparent than that between
remainders and reversions, what reason is there to think that the similar-
ity between an injury done with force and an injury done without force
could have been regarded as sufficiently close?
In the early actions of "special" trespass out of which case developed, 9
not only is there no attempt to show a similarity between the facts in
the case for which special trespass is brought and those for which an
action of "general" trespass would lie, but the emphasis is invariably
upon the dissimilarity. Unlike the plaintiffs in the early cases of entry
in consimili casu and ravishment of ward in socage tenure, the plaintiff
55. Apparent references to the in consimili casu clause occur in Adam v. Waltham,
Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I, [R. S.] 320 (1294) ; Abbot of C. v. Earl of Warren, Y. B. 21 &
22 Edw. I, [R.S.] 526 (1294); Maltalent v. Romyley, Y. B. Trin. 32 & 33 Edw. I,
(R.S.] 226 (1304). The latter case clearly refers to c. 1 of the Statute. See Rwismrmlf
BREVIUM (1687) f. 199 b and note 34, supra.
56. Y. B. Trin. 32 & 33 Edw. I, [R.S.] 282-290 (1304).
57. Y. B. Hil. 33 & 35 Edw. I, [R.S.] 426 (1307).
58. Id. at 430.
59. For a description of the transitional cases intermediate between the regular action
of trespass and the later established action of trespass on the case, see p. 1164, infra.
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in an action of special trespass on the case is interested in showing that
the situation is not in consimili casit but is in dissimili cas.
The case of Waldon v. Marshall0 was an action against a horse
doctor for negligently killing a horse which he had undertaken to cure.
"Belknap [for the plaintiff] . . . and this action is brought
because you worked your cure so negligently that the horse died,
wherefore it is reasonable that we maintain this special writ ac-
cording to the case, . .. for we can have no other writ.
"Kirton [for the defendant]. You may have a writ of trespass,
that he killed your horse, generally.
"Belknap. A general writ we could not have had, because the
horse was not killed by force, but died by default of his cure.
" . . .And then the writ was adjudged good."0G1
Clearly outlined by counsel is the distinction between the wrongful kill-
ing of a horse by direct force, for which trespass vi et armis lay, and
the wrongful killing of a horse by negligence, for which only the "spe-
cial" writ was available. Had Belknap hoped to sustain his client's writ
upon the authority given by the in consimili casit clause for the framing
of new writs, he would no doubt have argued that his case was similar
to that for which the regular writ of trespass lay. But instead he at-
tempted to show the great divergence between his client's case and the
case for ordinary trespass. There is little reason to think, therefore, that
Belknap was aware of any ground for bringing Waldon's special writ
within the provisions in the Statute of Westminster II, calling for like
cases.
62
60. Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 33, pl. 38 (1370).
61. Ibid.
62. Two other cases of the period reflect the same attitude of the court. In 1363,
a writ of trespass str le cas was brought against a miller for taking two bushels of
grain as multure from the plaintiff, who claimed that he and his ancestors had ground
without toll from time out of mind. The court refused to sustain the writ, saying, in
the words of Wichingham, J.: "Supposing that he had taken all your grain or half
of it, shall you have such a writ because he had taken more than he ought to take for
multure? No, you shall not, but a common writ of trespass; and so you shall have here.
Wherefore you take nothing by your writ." Y. B. MAfich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367).
Although the court did not state the permissible uses of the writ of trespass sur le cas
brought against the miller, they did say that it would not lie for a taking of grain as
multure, for which the common writ of trespass lay. In 1368 the court was thus un-
willing to admit that the writ of trespass sur le cas was in that respect a substitute for
the writ of trespass; for in whatever situation the writ of trespass could serve, trespass
stir le cas would not lie. In an action of trespass "on all the matter according to the
case," against a common innkeeper for lack of care in protecting the plaintiff's goods
[Y. B. Pasch. 42 Edw. III, f. 11, pl. 13 (1369)], it is clear that the writ was brought
because of negligence, for which general trespass did not lie; it w%-as, therefore, neces-
sary to have the writ "upon all the matter according to the case." General trespass vould
have served against the innkeeper only had he himself taken the plaintiff's goods.
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The court's view of the divergence between general trespass and the
'"special" writ of trespass is seen elsewhere in the Waldon case. The
court said that in a writ of trespass the phrases contra pacenl and ita negli-
gentcr were mutually exclusive. 3 This opinion is significant of a dis-
tinction between forceful injury (contra pacem) and injury from neg-
ligence (ita negligenter) so clear cut that it is unlikely that either the
Chancery or the court could ever have regarded the injuries as suffi-
ciently similar, within the meaning of chapter 24 of Westminster II,
to extend to the latter the remedy for the former.
In the suit brought by Justice Rikhiill and others for the disturbance
of their easement by the ploughing of the land of two parsons of Bro-
maye, Skrene. counsel for the plaintiffs, said:
"This writ is not contra paccn, but is a writ upon our case; and
if they had disturbed me with sword or staff or other weapon, I
should have nmade a good declaration against them contra paccin,
and I should be well able to maintain it upon my matter."'0 4
Skrene was saving that if the disturbance had been with force and arms,
lie would have brought a general writ of trespass; but the plaintiffs'
way across the defendants' land had been disturbed only because the
defendants' land was ploughed tip. and the general writ would not lie.
The distinction was between a peaceful disturbance of the plaintiffs'
rights and a disturbance which was against the peace, two wrongs which
were surely not within the degree of the similarity required by the King's
courts for the application of the in consiinili casit clause.
The fact that dissimilarity rather than similarity in the actual facts
of the case was responsible for the use of the "special" writ of trespass
was brought out again in Brownhe v. Hawkins."5 Townesende, counsel
for the defendant, said that one should not combine vi et armis and a
recital of special matter in the same writ; the former, a direct injury,
was a matter to be remedied by "general" trespass; the latter, a question
of negligence. could be remedied only by an action upon the case.
The dissimilarity between the facts leading to a "special" action of
trespass and those on which the "general" action could be based is not
63. "Kirton [for the defendant]. Challenge of the writ, in that the writ makes
mention contra pacem and in his count he has counted of his cure ita negligenter that
the horse died, so that that cannot be said to be against the peace. And the justices
were of the opinion that the writ was bad; and then the writ was read and was found
not to contain the words contra paccn, wherefore the writ was awarded good." Waldon
v. Marshall. Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 33, pl. 38 (1370).
64. Rikhill v. Two Parsons of Bromaye, Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 11, pl. 48 (1400).
65. Y. B. Trin. 17 Edw. IV, f. 3, pl. 2 (1477) (action for defamation and threat-
ened assault) ; cf. Y. B. 21 Hen. VI, f. 14, pl. 29 (1442); Y. B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII,
f. 8. pl. 18 (1505) ("And for the nonfeasance of a thing, action upon the case lies .. .
for by that I am damaged, and no general action lies there").
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only apparent to a modern Year Book reader; but in the Year Book
period it was emphasized by counsel and the courts themselves. This
would seem to eliminate the possibility that the "special" writ of trespass
was formed under the authorization of the clause of the Statute of
Westminster II providing that in like cases like remedies were to be
granted. From the beginning the necessary difference in the operative
factual elements of "special" and "general" trespass would have pre-
vented the application of the in consinili casu clause.
Further doubt is thrown upon the Traditionalist view by an examina-
tion of the date at which case began to appear as an established action.
A development of the action on the case shortly after the enactment of
the Statute of Westminster II would at least make more plausible the
theory that the action grew from the Statute than would a development
of the action many years later. The opinions of secondary authorities
upon the date of the origin of the action reveal a wide discrepancy.
Some writers of reputation ascribe the action to the end of the fourteenth
century, a hundred years after the statute; others believe it developed
at the beginning of that century. 0 What accounts for this variation of
opinion, and which opinion is the more tenable?
Almost without exception modern writers on the origin of the action
on the case have taken their examples of the early actions on the case
from one or more of these three sources: FitzHerbert's Abridgment,
Brooke's Abridgment, or the indices of the Vulgate Year Books.0  Upon
the sixteenth and seventeenth century writers represented in these three
works, therefore, may be laid some of the responsibility for the varied
and often erroneous conceptions of the date of the origin of case. They
were probably led astray by a tendency to classify as case all actions in
the Year Books of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in which case
would have been permissible in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
That the action of case expanded its scope steadily, and covered many
66. For opinions that case did not develop until the close of the fourteenth century
see GARnmR, LA NOTiON DE TnsEPAss EN DROrr ANGLuAs (197') 27; mAImTLAD, EguriT
AND THE FoRsxs OF AcrioN (1909) 348; PLuc~xETr, A CoNcIsE HIsTo,.OF or a o!X-
!SON LAW (2d ed. 1936) 335-36; 3 STRar, FouNATIONs OF LEGAL LIAIIILT" (1905)
249. Holdsworth says that actions on the case for conspiracy were common in the time
of Edward II. 3 HoLDswoarn, HxsTORv OF EGLISH LAW (1923) 406. Reeves (or
Finlason) says that there were a few examples of action mur le case in the Year Books
of Edward I and Edward II. 2 REEVES, HisToRY OF ENGLISH LAw (Finlason ed. 1869)
394, n. a.
67. The cases in 3 HoLDswoRTH, HisroRn OF ENGusH Lw (1923) 411, n. 1, and
in 2 REavFs, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1869) 395, are found in the index to the Vul-
gate edition of the Liber Assisarum. Those in Ho",as, THE Cmoedox LAw (1231) 275,
n. 2, were apparently taken from BRooxe's ABRIDGEIE. T. Those in 3 STREET, Foux-
DATiOmS OF LEGAL LIAnILiTY (1906) 250-252, seem to come from the index to the Vim-
GATE YEAR Boois.
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more wrongs in the latter period than in the earlier, has never been
denied; it is certainly substantiated by the Year Book reports themselves.
Yet modern scholars have been deceived by early writers who classified
as case actions which were not called case at the time they were tried.
FitzHerbert's Abridgment and Brooke's Abridgment formed the prin-
ciple "primary" source used by lawyers and legal historians until com-
paratively recent times. FitzHerbert includes some eighteen examples
from the fourteenth century reports under the heading Accion stir le
Case." The earliest of these were two cases of the reign of Edward II;
one, supposedly from the year 1318, seems to have been an action on
a writ of right, and the other, cited as 1323, was an action of trespass. 9
Included also is an action of trespass from 14 Edward III.70 The other
fourteenth century actions classified as case came later in the century,
1367 or after. Although all these were placed under the heading Accion
sur le Case, FitzHerbert said in fact that only seven were examples of
actions on the case and eleven were examples of some other form of
action. We shall probably never know why he put the latter in the group.
Some of the cases were illustrative of actions which case had partially
replaced by the sixteenth century; some involved a point of law later
important in the development of case; but others had little possible rela-
tion to case. Of the eleven citations of actions which were not case,
seven were ordinary actions of trespass ;7 and four were complaints by
bill. usually a bill of trespass - but, at any rate, never a bill of trespass
on the case.72 FitzHerbert was not even accurate in the seven actions
which he called case: Six seem to be citations of actions which were in
the transitional process between trespass and trespass on the case; one
was a dictum referring to a special judicial writ of trespass, not in-
volving an action of trespass on the case at all.73
Brooke's Abridgment lists twenty-six items 74 from the fourteenth
century under Accion stir le Case; eighteen of these he said were case.
68. FiTZHERBERT. LA GRAUNIDE ADRIDGUENT (1565) nos. 31-43, 46, 47, 50-52. The
first edition appeared in 1514.
69. Id. at no. 46 [Y. B. Mich. 11 Edw. 11 (1318)1; no. 47 [Y. B. Pasch. 16 Edw. II
(1323)].
70. Id. at no. 39 [Y. B. Trin. 14 Edw. III (1339)].
71. Id. at no. 32 [Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 29, pl. 14 (1368)]; no. 34 [Y. B. Trin.
45 Edw. III, f. 17, pl. 6 (1370)]; no. 38 [Y. B. Pasch. 31 Edw. III (1356)]; no. 39
[Y. B. Trin. 14 Edw. III (1339)]; no. 47 [Y. B. Pasch. 16 Edw. II (1323)]; no. 51
[Y. B. Trin. 19 Ric. 11 (1396)]; no. 50 [Y. B. Pasch. 29 Edw. III, 32 (1354)].
72. Id. at no. 40 [22 Lib. Ass., pl. 41 (1347)] ; no. 41 [30 Lib. Ass., pl. 19 (1355)];
no. 42 [42 Lib. Ass., pl. 8 (1367)]; no. 43 [42 Lib. Ass., pl. 9 (1367)]. On procedure
by bill see note 99, infra.
73. Id. at no. 46 [Y. B. Mich. 11 Edw. 11 (1317)].
74. BROOKE, LA GRAUNDE ADRIDG-MENT (1576) nos. 14-26, 45, 48, 68, 78-83, 85, 86,
120, 121.
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In fact only five of the twenty-six seem to be case or transitional actions
similar to case.7" The remainder are distributed as follows: trespass,
three;" deceit, two ;77 conspiracy, two ; bills and miscellaneous actions,
nine; 79 receipt, one;"' and four dicta"' (which might or might not have
really concerned case) made by way of illustration or analogy in the
course of the discussion of some other form of action. The earliest
example given by Brooke in this group of actions on the case is the
action of receipt from 21 Edward III, in the year 1347.
Although both FitzHerbert and Brooke indicated that only a few of
the examples classified under the heading of Accion sur le Case were
actually case, many of their readers overlooked the fact. That a specific
case was reported in one or both of the Abridgments in the chapter on
action on the case seemed to later lawyers and scholars to be adequate
proof that it was really an example of case, whether or not the Abridg-
ment report or the Year Book report itself warranted the assumption.
The later writers were also led astray by the fact that the distinction
between a casual dictum and a holding never troubled the sixteenth
century lawyer.
The editors of the Vulgate edition of the Year Books share with the
compilers of the Abridgments in the responsibility for misleading later
readers on the date of the appearance of the action on the case. In
marginal notes and in their index classification they labeled reports Ac-
cion sur le Case whenever they thought that case would have lain in
their own day, the latter seventeenth century. 
8 2
The dependence of modern writers upon these three sources for a
determination of the date of the origin of case makes the discrepancies
in their results understandable. The date accepted depended upon the
credulity of the writer. An examination of the opinions of modem
75. Id. at no. 14 [Y. B. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1366)]; no. 15 [Y. B.42 Edw. III,
f. 11, p1. 13 (1367)]; no. 22 [Y. B. 46 Edw. III, f. 19, pl. 19 (1371)]; no. 24 [Y. B.
48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1373)]; no. 86 [42 Lib. Ass., pl. 17 (1367)].
76. Id. at no. 19 [Y. B. 44 Edw. III, f. 20, pl. 16 (1369)]; no. 20 [Y. B. 45 Edw.
III, £17, p1. 6 (1370)]; no. 21 [Y. B. 46 Edw. III, f. 8, pl 2 (1371)].
77. Id. at no. 17 [Y. B. 43 Edw. III, f. 20, pl. 6 (1363) ]; no. 63 [Y. B. 3S Edw. III,
f. 13 (1363)].
78. Id. at no. 16 [Y. B. 42 Edw. III, f. 14, pl. 27 (1367)]; no. 23 [Y. B. 47 Edw.
III, f. 15, p1. 22 (1372)].
79. Bills: Id. at no. 78 [22 Lib. Ass., pl. 41 (1347)]; no. 79 [26 Lib. Ass., pL 45
(1351)]; no. 80 [26 Lib. Ass., pl. 62 (1351)]; no. 85 [42 Lib. Ass., pl. 8 (1367)]; no.
120 [38 Lib. Ass., pl. 13 (1363)]; no. 121 [41 Lib. Ass., pl. 12 (1366)]. Presentments:
no. 81 [27 Lib. Ass., pl. 73 (1352)]; no. 82 [27 Lib. Ass., pL 74 (1352)]. Noel dissei-
A;n: no. 83 [30 Lib. Ass., pL 5 (1355)].
80. Id. at no. 48 [Y. B. 21 Edw. III, f. 43 (1346)].
81. Id. at no. 18 [Y. B. 44 Edw. III, f. 4 (1369)]; no. 25 [reference not given];
no.26 [Y. B. 48 Edw. III, f. 25 (1373)]; no. 45 [29 Lib. Ass., pl. 35 (1354)].
82. E.g., Y. B. 44 Edw. III, f. 20, pl. 16 (1369).
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writers and of the cases upon which the opinions rest has yielded in-
teresting results. Of all the cases mentioned or referred to in connec-
tion with action on the case,83 in no case earlier than the last decade
of Edward III, 1367, did the reporter or the participants call it action
on the case or trespass on the case at the time it was tried,"4 and not
one from its context seems to bear any definite relationship to the action
on the case.
What, then, were the cases earlier than 1367 which are considered
by one person or another to have been case? Some of them were or-
dinary actions of trespass;"' some were actions for conspiracy;80 others
were actions for deceit ;87 and several were bills of some form or other.,
These have most frequently been confused with case. There were a
few other miscellaneous actions: debt, 0 waste," and some that are hard
to identify because of the fragmentary nature of the report; one was
probably an action of scandahtn magnattm,0 ' one seems to have been
a writ of ravishment of ward 02 one was possibly an action of replevin, 3
and one was a presentment.0 4
The Humber case of 1348 has perhaps been most frequently referred
to as a very early. if not the earliest known, example of trespass on the
case. This case presented a complaint by bill against a ferrynian on
the Humber who had drowned the complainant's mare by overloading
his boat." Careful consideration suggests four reasons why it does not
83. 1 have lheen unable to locate one reference, that from Y. B. Pasch. 16 Edw. II
(1323). given by FitzHerbert, but it seems clear from the abstract in the ABRIDGMENT
that the case was an ordinary action of trespass.
84. The earliest use of the phrase "trespass sur le cas" occurs in the report of a
case against a miller. Y. B. Mich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367). See note 106, infra.
85. Y. B. 29 Edw. III, f. 32 (1354); Y. B. Pasch. 31 Edw. III (1356); Y. B. 43
Edw. III. f. 30 (1368); Y. B. 44 Edw. III, f. 20 (1369); Y. B. 45 Edw. III, f. 17 (1370);
Y. B. 46 Edw. III, f. 8 (1371); Y. B. 48 Edw. III, f. 25 (1373) ; 42 Lib. Ass., pl. 17
(1367).
F6. Y. B. 38 Edw. III, f. 13 (1363); Y. B. 42 Edw. III, f. 14 (1367).
87. Y. B. 44 Edw. III, f. 4 (1370) (a dictum concerning deceit).
88. 22 Lib. Ass., pl. 41 (1347); 26 Lib. Ass., pl. 62 (1351); 26 Lib. Ass., pl. 48
(1351): 30 Lib. Ass.. pl. 19 (1355); 38 Lib. Ass., pl. 13 (1363); 41 Lib. Ass., pl. 12
(1366) ; 42 Lib. Ass.. pl. 8 (1367).
89. 22 Lib. Ass., f. 101. pl. 70 (1347).
90. Y. B. 48 Edw. III, f. 15, pl. 10 (1373).
91. Y. B. Trin. 14 Edw. III (1339).
92. 29 Lib. Ass.. pl. 35 (1354).
93. Y. B. 21 Edw. III, f. 43 (1346).
94. 27 Lih. Ass., pl. 73 (1352).
95. The Year Book report 122 Lib. Ass.. f. 94, pl. 41 (1347)] is as follows: "I de B
complained by bill that G de F on a certain day and year at B on Humber, had under-
taken [empris] to carry his mare, worth, etc., on his boat over the Humber river safe
and sound; but said G overloaded his boat with other horses as a result of which over-
loading thL mare was drowned, tortiously and to his damage, etc. Richmond. Judgment
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merit classification as an action on the case:"0 The first is that the plea
roll record indicates that the case did not turn on the failure to carry
out the agreement to transport the horse safely, but upon the defendant's
delict in overloading the boat; issue was joined on the defectunt, with
no hint of negligence or failure to perform an agreement, as would
have been the issue in an action on the case."' Secondly, the plaintiff's
action was neither covenant nor trespass, and therefore was not trespass
on the case; for the latter action was considered an integral part of
trespass until many generations later.0 This is indicated by the state-
ment of Richmond, counsel for the defendant, that "his action should
be by way of covenant or by way of trespass." Thirdly, as both the
Year Book report and the plea roll record prove, this was an action begun
by bill rather than an ordinary common law action begun by an original
writ out of the Chancery.0 That a wrong was remediable by a bill is
no proof that it was remediable by a writ of the same nature; and in
this case there was no mention of this as a bill of trespass on the case.
Complaint by bill was not an uncommon method of commencing an
action in the middle of the fourteenth century,10 0 but it was a method
distinct from that of suing an original writ out of Chancery. Finally.
neither the report nor the plea roll record said anything about this case
of the bill which does not suppose any tort in us. His action should be by writ by way
of covenant or by way of trespass; wherefore, etc., BANKWELL, J. It seems that you
committed a trespass against him when you overloaded your hoat whereby his mare
perished. Wherefore answer. Richmond. Not guilty." This case is lalteled in the mar-
gin Action sur le Case.
96. See Hastings, Note (No. 37, 1935) 13 BULm. INsT. HisT. R s. 35, ctncluding
that the common belief that this is the first case of assumpsit is probably erroneous.
97. Id. at 37.
98. The term trespass was applied, both to the general action of trespass vi et arinis
and to the "special" action of trespass, until a date much later than the fourteenth cen-
tury, so that trespass here would include both the general and the special forms of the
action- See Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Br. & B. 54, 59 (1821), where counsel says that "the
reporter has written trespass, meaning probably trespass on the case."
99. Procedure by bill was an alternate method to procedure by writ in the com-
mon law courts. A bill was generally a presentation of the complaint. drawn up by
the party himself, rather than a writ issued by the Chancery, and might he in a language
othcr than Latin. The bill in the Humber case is what is commonly called a bill in
the King's Bench, to distinguish it from two hetter known classes of bills, bills in cyre
and bills of Middlesex. On the bills in the King's Bench see Bolland, Introduction. in
SELcwr BILLs IN EYRE (Selden Society 1914) xl: Hale. :1 Discourse Coneerninq the
Courts of King's Bcich and Conmon Pleas. in HAnIGRAVF LAW T 41787) 359.
364-365 (a treatise written long after bills in the bench had ceased to he n i
100. An examination of the plea roll of the King's Bench on which the Humber case
was found [P. R. 0., K. B.27/354] shows that out of a thousand or so cases on that roll
there are about thirty complaints by bill. The bills were all complaints of trespass, mostly
of assault, and were all from Berkshire. in which county the King's Bench was sitting
for the term in question, Michaelmas, 22 Edward III. Hastings, supra note q6. at 35, 37.
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being trespass on the case. The only basis for connecting this case with
the latter action was the marginal notation in the printed Year Book
(made several centuries later).
The Humber case, then, is no exception to the general statement that,
as far as we now know, there were no actions like trespass on the case
earlier than the last years of the reign of Edward III. Thus for at
least eighty years after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster II
the in consimili casu clause had not been used to formulate a writ similar
to that of trespass on the case.
Nor is there any indication, when actions of case or transition actions
similar to case did begin to appear, that the action was considered at
that time to be derived from the Statute. Plucknett has made the point
that in the Year Book reports of actions upon the case no mention was
ever made of a connection between the action and the Statute."'0 Both
Landon and Holdsworth have tried to argue this away by saying that
the omission of any reference to the Statute has no evidential weight
because the statutory provision was so well known that a reference would
have been unnecessary. 10 2 Perhaps they have all overlooked the fact
that case was sometimes specifically labeled a common law action.
In an anonymous case of 1505, an action on the case for diverting
water from the stream which fed the plaintiff's mill, Pigot, counsel for
the defendant, demanded judgment of the writ because the plaintiff
could have brought an assize of nuisance. 3 " . for one shall never
have an action on the case where he can have other action at the com-
mon law." This statement in argument implies that an action on the
case was an action "at the common law," and was not connected with
any statute.
A more definite statement is found in the judgment of the court in
an anonymous case of 1409."04 This was a suit brought against a car-
penter for the non-performance of a parole promise to build a house;
the action has all the earmarks of "special" trespass though it was not
specifically called that, and was similar to the action later called trespass
on the case.
"HILL, J. Because it seems to the court that this action which is
taken at common law is based on a thing which is covenant in itself,
of which nothing is shown, the court awards that you take nothing
by your writ, etc."
The wide range of subjects covered by the action of case in its fully
developed form casts further doubt upon the theory of its derivation
101. Plucknett, supra note 3, 31 COL. L. REv. 783.
102. Note (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 334, 335; Landon, supra note 5, at 77.
103. Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, f. 30, pl. 5 (1505).
104. Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 33, pl. 60 (1409). On this point see also a case the mean-
ing of which is not clear: Say v. Kent, Y. B. Trin. 12 Ric. II (A. F.] 7 (1388).
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from the Statute of Westminster II. Within the boundaries set for it
as a remedy for indirect injuries, case expanded in many directions. A
number of wrongs for which it early served as a remedy have been noted
incidentally: negligent treatment of a horse by a farrier or by a horse
doctor; negligent treatment of an injured man by a surgeon; an inn-
keeper's failure to protect his guest's goods; disturbance of a right of
way. From cases for misfeasance and later for nonfeasance in the per-
formance of an agreement, came a large part of the law of simple
contract. At a later time, case lay also for waste. And in tile role of
an action for trover and conversion, a substitute for detinue and for
the old criminal actions for theft, trespass on the case produced the
law of personal property.
It would be unique to find so large a list of subjects in a statutory
action, even in an action evolved by the Chancery under the provisions
of chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster II. Statutory actions and
actions such as the writ of ravishment of ward in socage, though de-
veloped from a statutory provision, were limited in scope to the specific
situation for which the statute provided a remedy.10 3 This same principle
generally limited the extension of any new writ formulated by the
Chancery. There are many writs in the Register which are said to have
been invented by this Chancellor or that clerk, yet most of these writs
applied only to one particular circumstance. It seems doubly doubtful,
therefore, that the writ of special trespass, or trespass on the case, which
not only applied to various situations when it first appeared in the Year
Books, but continued to expand without further statutory enlargement,
could have come, either directly or indirectly, from the Statute of Vest-
minster II.
To summarize: the Year Book cases furnish strong proof in them-
selves that the early forms of the action on the case were not derived
from the Statute of Westminster II. The fact that counsel and courts
stressed the dissimilarity between case and trespass rather than the simi-
larity required under the in consinili casu clause, the fact that the action
was regarded as at common law rather than under a statute, the fact
that the action on the case covered a wide range of subjects, and finally
the fact that the action was not developed until long after the Statute,
these items of internal evidence added to the already formidable array
of external proof practically destroy the traditional theory that the action
of trespass on the case was derived from the in consinili casu clause of
chapter 24 of the Statute of Westminster IL
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRESPASS ON THE CASE
That the action of trespass on the case was the result of a common
law development independent of the Statute of Westminster 11 is shown
105. See pp. 1151-54, msipra.
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in the Year Book reports. By a process of evolution and growth the
action of case as "special" trespass branched away from the older action
of trespass vi ct arm is. Thus the action of trespass on the case began its
career not as a new and distinct form of action but as a special type of
the well known action of trespass - a means developed by the courts
to provide a remedy for injuries caused without direct force which were
outside of the scope of trespass vi et armis.
In the first case found among the printed judicial records of the four-
teenth century in which the phrase trespass sur le cas occurs, a distinction
appears to have been made between "common" trespass and the writ
in the case. This early action of trespass sur le cas was brought in 1367
against a miller for taking multure when the plaintiff claimed the right
to have his grain ground toll-free. 1' The report indicates a distinction
made by both counsel and court between a special writ of trespass sur
le cas or sur ma niattcr, and a "general writ with force and arms" or a
.,common writ of trespass." The use of the words "general" and "con-
mon" writ of trespass. in contrast to the form of the writ of trespass
called by the reporter sur le cas, implies that the latter was a special
form of the more usual writ of trespass.' 7
A similar distinction occurs in the case of Waldon v. Marshall. Wil-
liam de \Valdon brought a "special writ according to the case" against
John Marshall for negligently killing the plaintiff's horse while seeking
to doctor it.'0 s Perhaps because the circumstances of the case differed
from those in which trespass vi et arm is would lie,1 09 the plaintiff brought
"special writ according to the case." When counsel for the defendant
said that the plaintiff might "have a general writ of trespass, that he
106. Y. B. Mich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367). The form of the writ is given
by the reporter: "That when the said John, etc., and his ancestors from time of which
memorv does not run, were accustomed to grind their grain without multure, etc., the
said defendant, etc., with force and arms [-z et armis] interrupted the said complainant
from milling without multure" by taking two bushels of grain. The report continues:
"Candish [for the defendant] .. .a general writ that he took his grain with force and
arms lies, and not this writ; judgment of the writ. Belknap [for the plaintiff]. The
writ is taken upon my matter [sur ma matter] and if he has taken toll where he ought
not to have taken it, I shall have a writ against him. Thorpe. You shall have a quod
permittat against the tenant of the soil, and there it shall be tried, and not in a writ
against the defendant. . . . WICHINGHAI, J. Supposing that he had taken all your
grain or half of it, shall you have such a writ because he had taken more than he ought
to take for multure? No, you shall not, but a common writ of trespass; and so you
shall have here. Wherefore you take nothing by your writ."
107. A case of 1369 points to the same conclusion. See note 126, izfra. This action
was similar to later examples of action on the case against a negligent innkeeper, but it
is worthy of note that in 1369 the action was not called "action on the case" or even
"trespass on the case."
108. Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 33, pl. 38 (1370).
109. See p. 1156, minpra.
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killed your horse," Belknap, for the plaintiff, replied: "A general writ
we could not have had, because the horse was not killed by force . .
and then the writ was adjudged good." There is a clear distinction be-
tween the writ actually brought and a general writ of trespass. Had
Waldon lived two hundred years later his remedy against John Marshall
would have been called trespass on the case. Here the writ was regarded
by the reporter, and apparently by counsel, not as a new writ with a
distinctive name, but as a variation of the established general writ of
trespass svi et arinis in the form of a "special writ according to the case."
A case of the year 1375 presents a view of the "special" action of
trespass which enables us to see how it had already separated to some
extent from the parent action of trespass but was still considered part
of the parent action. "A writ of trespass upon his case" (sur son cas)
was brought against a surgeon for maiming the plaintiff by negligent
cure of his wounded hand which the defendant had undertaken (eliprist)
to heal."'0 The defendant denied the undertaking, and offered to wage
his law as proof.""
"Honington [for the plaintiff]. This is an action of trespass and
something which falls within the cognizance of the country, in which
case wager of law is not allowed, wherefore for default of answer
we pray judgment and ask our damages.
"CANDIsH, J. This writ has nothing to say of force and arms or
breach of the peace, so wager of law is acceptable here; . . .and
so is the opinion of all the court."
That the defendant's offer of wager of law in this case was sustained
by the opinion of all the court indicates that this action of trespass stir
son cas was distinguished in their minds from the regular action of
trespass. The mode of proof for the latter action was and always had
been trial by jury, and wager of law would never have been allowed
where there was a breach of the peace.
Yet it would be incorrect to infer from this case that trespass stir
son cas was an action entirely separate from trespass. A close relation
betveen them was obviously present in the minds of the counsel and
the court. When the defendant offered wager of law, Honington for
110. Y. B. Hil. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1375). The first part of the record of the
case reads: "And the writ read that when his right hand had been wounded by one
T. B., he against whom the writ is brought undertook [cnprist] to cure his hand, but
that by the negligence of him I. M. and his cure, his hand was so injured that he was
tortiously maimed and to his damage. . . . And the writ was not 'i c armis nor contra
pacem. Gascoigne. He did not undertake to cure him of his malady as he has supposed;
ready to wage his law."
111. In fact the defendant in this case waived his tender of law because he saw an
adjournment to the next term. Wager of law was thus not the mode of proof in this
case, and it is not a precedent for later actions of trespass on the case.
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the plaintiff declared that this was an unqualified action of trespass. That
his client had brought a writ of trespass "upon his case" seemed to
Honington no reason for thinking that this was anything other than
trespass. Although it sustained the tender of wager of law, the court
did not say that the type of action was different from trespass. Nor did
they reply to Honington's objections that the action was trespass on the
case and not trespass: they merely said that where the writ alleged no
breach of the peace. wager of law was permissible.' 1 2
Cases from the Year Books of the succeeding century show quite
clearly that for many years the action which we know as case was in
a transitional stage in which it was known as the special form of the
general action of trespass. In the action of trespass quare clausum fregit
brought by one Thomas Frome in 1409. there was a statement of the
situation in which the two types of trespass would lie. 113 The question
was whether the plaintiff's writ of trespass vi et arnzis would lie where
the property in the sheep concerned was in another: "HANKlFORD, J.
• . . For if I lend you certain sheep for a certain time and within the
time I take them out of your ward. you will not have a general writ
of trespass qnare vi et armis, but a writ formed sur le cas, as here."
A similar distinction between the general writ of trespass and the
writ "on the case" appears in the case of Hugh G. v. William T. in
1442."' The court, in deciding whether there had been any wrong in
William's taking Hugh's child, discussed the following analogy.
"FULTHORPE. J. . . . For in an action of trespass brought against
me for a horse wrongfully taken and I say that he himself is seised
of the horse (Judgment if the action, etc.) this is a good plea. And
so was the rule before Hankford in the King's Bench, and the rea-
son was this: that it would be against reason that he ought to receive
112. Wager of law as a mode of proof in an action of case apparently was never
again suggested or accepted. Its appearance in the case of 1375 may indicate that the
rules governing the "special" form of the action of trespass were far from fixed.
Reeves. to be sure. said that wager of law could be used in actions of trespass on the
case. and that for the same reason, i.e.. the lack of vi ct armis in the writ, the plaintiff
was entitled to process only by distraint and not by the capias. 2 REEVES, HISTORY OF
EXC.;SHi LAW (1869) 397. Process by capias in actions of case was provided by the
Statute 19 HEN. VII. c. 9 (1503), supposedly to remove this difficulty. It seems that
capias wa- used early in the fifteenth century in actions of "special" trespass. See 15
STAFFORDSHIRE HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS (William Salt Archaeological Society 1894)
56, 77, 86. 97, 106, 107; 16 id. (1895) at 45, 49.
113. Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 23, pl. 46 (1409). In this case Frome charged the defend-
ant with (1) breaking his close, (2) leading a servant out of the plaintiff's service, and
(3) taking some sheep. It turned out in the course of the trial that the sheep had once
belonged to the servant, who had lent them to the plaintiff for a year; but sometime,
either after or before the end of the year, he had taken them again and sold them to the
defendant.
114. Y. B. Mich. 21 Hen. V. f. 14. pl. 29 (1442).
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damages for the whole horse, when he himself is seised of the horse,
wherefore in such a case he would have a special action of trespass
sur son cas supposing that his horse had been long detained ...
"PASTON, J .... But let us say that my horse was taken with
force and afterwards the horse was returned to me [by the taker],
I shall have a general action of trespass and not special as has been
said."
Although the quotations from each case represent nothing more than
dicta, they are significant in indicating that, when the justices wished to
differentiate the forms of the action of trespass, they still spoke of one
as the "general" action and of the other as the "special" action.
Still later in the fifteenth century this mode of distinguishing the two
forms of trespass continued. In the action of trespass sur le cas brought
by the Bishop of Salisbury to recover assize and assay of bread and ale
in the city of Salisbury, Danvers, C. J., talked at some length about the
special writ sur le cas.'15 The distinction was made again in the action
sur son cas brought by Thomas Browne against one Hawkins, for de-
famation and threatened assault.' Townesende, for the defendant, sug-
gested a hypothetical writ which he said would abate, "for I put matters
for t:wo actions in the writ, that is to say, one for action upon the case,
the other for a general writ of trespass." In an anonymous case of
1498, an action of trespass on the case for nuisance, this method of
differentiation appears." 7  The plaintiff, a Prior, alleged that the de-
fendant had built a lime pit so close to a certain stream running to his
houses in Southwerk that the stream had been polluted, causing the
Prior's tenants to leave the houses served by that stream. Keble, for
the defendant, challenged the writ because the plaintiff should have "a
general writ of trespass quare vi et armis and not a writ upon the case."
It is impossible to read these cases without concluding that to the late
fourteenth and fifteenth century legal mind there were two types of
trespass, general trespass and special trespass. General trespass was
synonymous with trespass vi ct arm is; and in its early days the form
115. Y. B. Trin. 38 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 20 (1459). The Bishop claimed the franchises
by virtue of letters patent of Richard II to the Bishop's predecessor. The question
before the court was whether the Bishop's writ was good without a statement that the
city of Salisbury was a part of the fee of the Bishop's predecessor at the time of the
letters patent. In the course of the argument Danvers, C. J., said: "The writ ought
to be, qtod predictus Episco pus Qucrens in tcrris ct fcodis sits predielis, and this ,%hich
is alleged in the court will make the writ good; but this is not clne here. This is one
of the most important points which should be included in the writ, particularly [name-
ment] when it is a special writ sur le cas which must include all the matter as clearly
as the count."
116. Y. B. Trin. 17 Edw. IV, f. 3. pl. 2 (1477).
117. Y. B. Trin. 13 Hen. VII, f. 26, pl. 4 (1498).
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of the action of trespass which later became trespass on the case was
"special" trespass. When the phrase "on the case" was used in con-
nection with "special" trespass, it was a purely descriptive phrase that
referred only to the nature of the writ - a writ "on the case" - and not
to the action itself.' "On the case" had had a long history before it
became connected with the "'special" form of trespass. It occurs in the
endorsement to many petitions to Parliament during the period 1300--
1350."' In the petitions the endorsement often read: "Let him go to
the Chancery and have a writ upon his case." Although the phrase was
applied to many types of writ, the meaning was always, "let him have
a writ suitable to the facts of his case," whether the writ was a writ
of course, a newly formed writ thereafter to become a writ of course,
or a writ of grace, drawn for a peculiar situation.12  This general
descriptive meaning of the phrase continued after 1350.Y" In petitions
to the King by the Commons during the reign of Henry IV the phrase
is used to mean a writ suitable to the plaintiff's needs.122  Also, it is
IM1. That the "'special" form of the action of trespass was developed to provide a
remedy for certain wrongs outside the scope of ordinary writs of trespass vi ct aris
seems a reasonahie cniclusion from the cases. See pp. 1156 et seq.. supra. If the action
had hleen .tatutorv, its name would probably have been fixed from the beginning, as in
the writ of entry in consimili cas,.
119. The early printed Rolls of Parliament contain a number of private petitions
to Parliament; some were indorsed in this manner. See note 120, infra.
120. Of the petitions so endorsed, the first group is composed of petitions for
wrongs that could be redressed by regular writs of course, which the petitioner had
failed to sue. or that had not availed him because of the offender's influence. Most of
the writs required were trespass vi ct armis; there were a few examples of conspiracy.
See, c.y., 1 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM (1767) 316b, 375a, 321a, 382b, 409a. The petitions
in the second group represented situations later remediable by a writ of course which
apparently had not developed at the time of the petition. In one case, Frowyk v. Lcuke-
otor,', the petition was responsible for the establishment of the later writ of course. See
1 RTC1.l P.ARIAM.xToRU1. (1767) 278a, 155a; 2 id. at 28a, 39b, 218b. On the use of
the in consimili case clause in Frowyk z,. Leukenore to support the newly formed writ
of ravishment of ward in socage tenure, see note 50, supra. The third class of petitions
were statements of unusual situations in which extraordinary remedies were required;
they were the petitions for writs of grace. See 1 RoTuui PARLIAMENTORUM (1767) 416b,
331b, 439a; 2 id. at 93a, 388a.
121. Of all the petitions endorsed with the phrase "on the case" in the printed
ROTULI PARLIAAMENTORUM, only two were after 1330; the larger number occurred be-
tween 1310 and 1330.
122. These petitions asked for statutory provisions. One, in 1401, was a petition for
the enforcement of the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the Admiralty [13 Ric.
II, (1), c. 5 (1389) ; 15 Ric. II, c. 3 (1391)]. This petition became law in 2 HEN. IV,
c. 11 (1400). Another petition, in 1413, was for restriction of the fees charged by the
Church in testamentary matters, and for some means to compel the ordinary to settle
an estate. The provisions were embodied in Statute 4 HEN. V, c. 8 (1416). The petitions
will be found in 3 ROTULL PARLIAMENTORUM (1767) 472b; 4 id. at 9a.
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found applied to forms of action other than trespass, in at least two
Year Book reports, one from 139 01" and the other from 1430.1"
It is therefore not surprising to find a descriptive meaning in the
phrase "on the case," or its equivalents, in the early actions of "special"
trespass. In a case of trespass snr le cas against a miller for taking
multure, Belknap, apparently regarding sur le cas as synonymous with
"taken upon my matter," said, "the writ is taken upon my matter [sttr
123. Abbess of Shaftesbury v. Broncker, Y. B. Hil. 13 Ric. II, (A. F.] 10S (1390)
(an action of waste). According to the Year Book, the Abbess "porta bref de wasit sur
soun cats devers un . . ." Plucknett translates the clause as "brought a writ on the
case for Waste against one . . ." The summary of the case appearing at the top of the
Year Book report says, "bref de wast fit porte e'rs tenant a volente of le bref recite
soun cas et fut agardc bon quod quere." There can be no doubt that this was an action
of waste, rather than an action of trespass on the case. The writ "rehearsed the statute"
(presumably the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 EDw. I, c. 5), as was customary in writs
of waste; the plea roll record of the case, printed with the Year Book report, is like the
record of a regular action of waste. Cf. Monceux v. Monceux, Y. B. Hil. 13 Ric. 11.
[A.F.] 110, 111 (1390). The Abbess sued a writ of waste "on her case" because Broncker
was a tenant at will, who had committed so much damage that the usual means of
recovering from a copyhold tenant would have been inadequate. An action of Waste lay
ordinarily only against freeholders. It was an extraordinary circumstance, and an extra-
ordinary remedy. See Pluckmett in Y. B. 13 Ric. II, [A. F.] xliii-xlv. In the seventeenth
century the scope of case was extended to cover waste [cf. Greene v. Cole. 2 Vms.
Saund. 252 (1670)], but that was long after the Ablbss of Shaftcshiurv was dead and
forgotten. In PLCCKNETT, CoXCISE HISTORY OF ENMLISh L,.w (2d ed. 1936) 336. the
Shaftesbury case is cited to prove that action on the case was known by that name
before the end of the fourteenth century. Put it seems clear from the Year Book re-
port itself that this interpretation of the case, as an action on the case for waste, instead
of an action of waste, is in error.
124. This was an anonymous suit on a writ of deceit "on the case,' against a de-
fendant who had sold a butt of bad wine as good wine to the plaintiff. Y. B. Mich.
9 Hen. VI, f. 53, pl. 37 (1430). The relationship between the action of trespass on
the case and the action of deceit is a complex matter. Deceit, of courfe, was an old
common law action, dating at least from the early thirteenth century [see SE.Ecr CIvIL
PLEAS (Selden Society 1890) pl. 111], but it was an action which at that time lay only
for deception of the court. In the early fifteenth century, however, the action seems
to have included deception, whether in litigation or in a sale. In the latter field it en-
countered the new form of trespass, trespass on the case, which could be brought for
damage suffered in a fraudulent sale. Apparently for a time the two actions lay for
the same wrong; the REGISTRUM BREVIt'M (1687) has writs of trespass on the case
similar to the writ of deceit (upon which the 1430 case was apparently based) given
in FiTZHERBFRT's NEW NATURA BREviu~I. See 3 Ho.uswoRmli, HtsT OY OF Enm.su
LAW (1923) 386, 408. In trespass on the case for a fraudulent sale the emphasis was
upon the damage suffered; in deceit the emphasis was on the deception. Case gradually
drove deceit out of the field of fraudulent sale, and also from the field of fraud in
litigation. Cf. Somerton v. Colles, Y. B. Trin. 11 Hen. VI, f. 55, pl. 26 (1432) (action
of trespass on the case for deceit) with Y. B. Mich. 11 Hen. VI, f. 2, pl. 6 (1432)
(action of deceit). The action of deceit lingered on as a special remedy for breach of
warranty until changes in its nature took place in the eighteenth century. jra-ns, Snorrr
HISTORY OF ENGLISia LAW (1928) 315-316.
1169
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ma inatter]."'25 If this was accurate, it is clear that the phrase was not
connected with the in consim ili cast clause of the Statute of Westminster
II. Again in the 1369 case against a common innkeeper, the form of
the writ of trespass used coincides with the form of later writs of case
against a negligent innkeeper. 26 Yet the writ used in 1369 was described
by the reporter as a writ of trespass "upon all the matter according to
the case." This report shows that the later abbreviated form "on the
case" in a writ against an innkeeper had the same significance as the
fuller phrase used here and that the sixteenth century writ of case
against an innkeeper derived its name not from the in consimili casu
clause, but from the idea expressed in "upon all the matter according
to the case." or from some similar phrase.
Other cases of the late fourteenth century show variation in the form
of the phrase, indicative of the fact that the writ of trespass had been
altered to fit the case at hand. The writ in the case of Waldon v.
11arshall, was called by Belknap "this special writ according to the
case."' 2 7 In a case of trespass brought against a farrier for laming the
plaintiff's horse.' 28 Persay, for the defendant, demanded judgment of the
writ because it was a writ of trespass without vi et armis. "FiNcIIDEN,
C. J. Ile has brought his writ in his case [en son cas], so his writ is
good."' -' The writ in the action against the surgeon was called a "writ
of trespass on his case [sur son casl."" 0  The phrase which later became
the official name of the action of "special" trespass, on the case, was
125. See note 106. supra; Y. B. Mich. 41 Edw. II1, f. 24, pl. 17 (1367).
126. Y. B. Pasch. 42 Edw. III, f. 11, pl. 13 (1369). See note 107, supra. The report
in the Year Book begins: "Trespass was brought by one 1f' against one T, an inn-
keeper and his servant, and he counted how by the common use and custom of England,
in the case of the common inn [here follows the standard form of the writ; see Rmls-
rt;aR BRXVAIU (1687) L 1041 . . . and he counted that he, the said W, came on such
a day in the town of Canterbury to the said T and there lodged with him, and lie had a
horse and other goods and chattels, to wit [etc.] ; and he took his room and put therein
the said goods and chattels and silver. and then lie went out into the town for other things;
and while lie was in the town the said goods and chattels and money were carried from
his room by evildoers, through lack of care on the part of the innkeeper and his ser-
vants. tortiously and against the peace, to his damage, etc. And lie had a writ upon all
the matter according to the case."
127. Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 33, pl. 38 (1370).
128. Y. B. Trin. 46 Edw. III, L 19, pl. 19 (1373).
129. This action was described by the reporter simply as "trespass," though it was
obviously what later would have been called trespass on the case.
130. Y. B. Hil. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1375). In 1372 a writ of trespass "com-
prising such matter" was brought by a Prior against one John for failure to repair
ditches resulting in the inuindation of the Prior's land. Y. B. Trin. 45 Edw. III, f. 17,
pl. 6 (1372). The writ was abated because it contained contra pacenm where no breach
of the peace was alleged. For a later action of trespass on the case for failure to per-
form customary service,. see Y. B. Trin. 22 Hen. VI, f. 46, pl. 36 (1444) ; cf. REals-
TUtmm BREVIUM (1687) f. 100.
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thus originally descriptive of the writ of trespass changed to suit the
complainant's case.
Nor did the use of phrases interchangeable with "on the case" cease
at once. In the case of Rikhill v. Two Parsons of Bronlaye, for disturb-
ance of an easement, the report describes the action as one of trespass
"containing such matter."13' Later Skrene said, "This writ is not contra
pacent., but is a writ upon our case [stir nostre case]," and Markham, J.,
spoke of a "good writ of trespass upon your matter," while Hill said,
" . . . it seems reasonable that he should recover by such a writ founded
upon his case [foundue stir son case]," 1 2 Thus in 1400, in a writ of
trespass, the phrase "upon his case" was analogous to "containing such
matter," "founded upon his case," and "trespass upon your matter."
These phrases were descriptions of the matter contained in the writ and
were not in the least words of art.
In the case of Walton v. Brinti, the plaintiff, counting on the non-
performance of a parole agreement, brought a writ which the reporter
called "a writ formed upon special matter."' 33  In the action brought
against Watkins, millmaker of London, Babington, J., talked of a "good
writ of trespass sur le mattere."' 4 All these cases show that at the end
of the fourteenth century and for some time thereafter, the phrase "on
the case" and similar phrases still retained their general descriptive
quality. 35
131. Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 11, pl. 48 (1400).
132. "MARXHAMX, J. If you have common of pasture in my land, and I cause all my
land to be ploughed so that your beasts cannot pasture, shall you have a good writ of
trespass upon your matter? [As if to say, no.] Hill [serieant-at-law, in speaking of the
plaintiff's writ] . . . and for the trespass which has been done to him in the disturb-
ance of his ease, it seems reasonable that he should recover by such a writ founded
upon his case."
133. Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 3, p1. 9 (1400). This is the earliest known e.ample
of "special" trespass brought for the non-performance of a parole promise. The writ
was not sustained.
134. Y. B. HiL. 3 Hen. VI, f. 36, pl. 33 (1425). The plaintiff brought an action of
trespass against Watkins for failure to perform a parole agreement to make a mill for
the plaintiff by Christmas in a given year. The writ was not sustained. "BNDNGroN, J.
If one makes an agreement [covenant] with me to cover my roim or a certain house
within a certain time, and within the time he does not cover it, so that for default of
covering the floor of the h,.iuse all is damaged by the rain, in this case I say that I would
have a good writ of trespass sur le inattcre shown against him who made the agreement
with me." In the next century, the sixteenth, trespass on the case lay for nonfeasance
of a parole promise; but as early as 1425 une juttice was in lavur uf the remedy.
135. Other cases from the fifteenth century show how the name of the action on
the case was connected with the form of the writ. In an action of trespass sir le cas in
1429 the plaintiff complained that the defendant had arrested hin on two different occa-
sions when he was going to London about judicial business. The plaintiff's count vas
fuller than the writ; the latter was challenged by the defendant: "Fulthorpc. The writ
is general and the count is special str Ie cas, in which case the writ ought to be special.
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But during the fifteenth century "on the case" became definitely at-
tached to the "special" writ of trespass. until finally in the late fifteenth
and the sixteenth centuries its association with the "special" form of
trespass became so strong that its earlier meaning was forgotten. "Action
onl the case" no longer meant the writ which suited the plaintiff's case,
whatever kind of writ that was. but came to be the name of the action
which gave a remedy for damages from an indirect injury of some
sort. 136
Although a fixed name for the action of "special" trespass was slow
in developing and the action itself was slow in breaking quite away from
the parent action, early in its history the form of the writ became dif-
ferent from that for general trespass. Long before the action of special
trespass became universally known as action on the case the form of
the writ of special trespass had been distinguished from the form of
the writ of general trespass; it omitted the vi et armis and contra parent
phrases of the general writ. and for the conventional description of the
offense in the general writ- quare clausiiun fregit, de bonis asportatis,
or some other-it substituted a more or less careful narration of the
iacts of the particular case."'
Though the form of the writ of special trespass was differentiated
early in its career from that of general trespass, the form of the writ
was not fixed from its first appearance. The writ given in the first Year
Book report of an action of trespass sur 1c cas, the miller's case of 1368,
comprising the substance of the matter. Cottesmore. In each writ of trespass, one
shows more in the count than in the writ. wherefore. etc. BARNGTOx. J. The writ is
founded sur le cas, in which case it ought to have comprised special matter, and this it
does not. Wherefore you take nothing by your writ." Y. B. Trin. 7 Hen. VI, f. 45, pl.
24 (1429). Similar statements occur in the report of the Bishop of Salisbury's case (see
note 115. supra]. "And judgment of the writ was demanded because this was a writ sur
son cas. in which all his matter ought to be expressed, else the writ was worth nothing
. . . DANVERS. C. J. . . namely, when it is an especial writ sur Ic cas, which must
comprise all this matter as clearly as the count." Y. B. Mich. 38 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 20
(1459). Townesende speaks of an "action upon my case reciting the special matter,"
in Browne v. Hawkins. Y. B. Trin. 17 Edw. IV, f. 3, pl. 2 (1477) (defamation and
threatened assault).
136. The earliest example in the Year Books of the use of the phrase "action on the
case" in a technical manner seems to be the case of John Erich, Y. B. Mich. 34 Hen. VI,
f. 4, pl. 11 (1455).
137. For a typical writ of general trespass, see REGIsTtm BREVIUM (1687) f. 93;
for a typical writ of case see id. at f. 104. Unfortunately for clarity the writ of case
might sometimes contain the phrase vi el arinis as a purely descriptive term where the
phrase was warranted by the facts of the case. See Y. B. Hil. 39 Hen. VI, f. 44, pl. 7
(1461). FitzHerbert says that the writ of case might even contain the phrase contra
pacem, although such a writ must certainly have been very unusual. FITzHERBERT,
NEw NATURA BREVIUM f. 92 E. And in the printed Registrum Brevium (1687), the writs
of trespass on the case are not differentiated from the writs of general trespass, but are
mixed with the others.
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differed, for instance, from later writs of trespass on the case in that
it contained the phrase vi et armis.'35
Cases in the succeeding years indicate that there was no general
knowledge of the proper form of a special writ of trespass. In TV'aldoi
v. llfarshall, the court ruled that contra pacein and ila ncyliqenlctr were
mutually exclusive in a writ of trespass, so that if indeed the writ
of trespass "according to the case" contained ita nqcligcntcr, it must
omit the conventional contra pacem.' Likewise in the action of tre-pa-s
against a farrier in 1373 the court ruled that the writ of trespass en
son cas need not contain the traditional trespass phrase T'i el armis.'
By 1375. then. it was fairly well settled by court decision- that the u rit
of special trespass should not include the trespass phrase,: in the casze
against the surgeon of that year. a "writ of trespass upon his case." the
reporter thought it well to note in the Year Pnook report that' "the %%rit
was not vi et ari.s nor contra paceton".
From the later fourteenth century oin. therefore. the writ of special
trespass. or trespass on the case, was well e-tablished as a variant form
of the general writ of trespass. The one form of the actili was even
contrasted with the other by the difference in the writs. Thus in an
anonymous case oi 1390 the plaintiff brought an action 'if trcspa¢
against a defendant who had borrowed his horse to ride to a certain
place, but had ridden it further on to another and thereby mi enfcchled
the horse that the defendant had had to kill it.' - Ga- cuigne. for the
defendant, demanded "judgment of the writ which says 'with force and
arms.' for upon his own showing he ought to have had a writ on his
case [sur son cas] .' Again in the case concerning Justice Rikhill. an
action of trespass -upon our case" for disturbance of an easement,
138. Y. B. Mich. 41 Edw. III, f. 24. pl. 17 (1368).
139. Y. B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, f. 33, p). 38 (1370).
140. Y. B. Trin. 46 Edw. III, f. 19, pl. 19 (1373) "Persav. He has brought a writ
of trespass against us which does not contain the v.i et armis; judgment of the writ.
FicHDEN. C. J. He has brought his writ in his case, so his writ is good. Pcrsay. Also
he has not supposed in his count that he bailed us the horse to shoe. so it should be
understood that ii any trespass was done, it was done against the peace; wherefore
judgment. And then the writ was adjudged good."
141. Y. B. Hil. 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1375): cf. Y. B. Trin. 45 Edw. III. f. 17,
pl. 6 (1371). An action of trespass "comprising such matter" was brought by a Prior
for failure to perform customary services; "the writ was contra pacein and for such
was challenged and abated for this cause, etc:' Later trespass on the case w'as brought
for this case; it is possible that the later form of the writ was determined by the errors
in the Prior's case, for the marginal note to the writ in the Register says: "Non dicatur
in isto brevi nec constinili contra taccm nostrain, ptr ceo que liel brcve fuit abbatt tcr-
mino Trin. an. 45 E. 3 pur tiel catuse." It may be that the writ of case was evolved by
just such a process of trial and error as we see in the Prior's case. RE-1, Tt'R.t BREV1t'1s
(1687) f. 100.
142. Y. B3. 13 Ric. II, [A. F.] 104 (1390).
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Skrene for the plaintiffs said: "This writ is not contra pacem, but is a
writ upon our case.""14'
The form of the writ of trespass on the case was therefore defined
as a writ of trespass that lacked the vi et arm is and contra pacem phrases,
and included a recital of the special matter. 4 4 Yet the cases also show
that the form of the writ at one time was not determined by a chancery
conference, for in that case the writ would always have been the same.
The cases prove that the form was evolved over a period of years, be-
ginning p)erhaps' with the vi ct armis form in the miller's case, and was
more or less perfected by the time of the surgeon's case of 1375 in which
the reporter took such care to note that the writ contained neither vi et
arinlis nor conlra patent. Had the writ been framed in accordance with
tile in consintili casut clause, its form would have been settled once and
for all time by a chancery conference, just as the writ of entry in con-
siili casit was established in 1310. The writ of special trespass, how-
ever. was a writ of evolutionary growth, a writ in which the writ of
general trespass was varied to provide the remedy needed.
The evolution of this special form of the writ of trespass is seen in
the )ear Book reports of these early cases. There was need at the
coinloi law for a remedy for damage suffered for a wrong committed
without force. To meet that need, the court permitted the use of a
special form of the writ of trespass, a form which omitted the vi et armis
and the conlra pacein because they were not in accord with the facts of
the case. This variation of the general writ of trespass was known first
as special trespass or as trespass "upon my matter," but finally became
a separate form of action known as trespass on the case.
The transition was gradual. Beginning as an extraordinary remedy,
the special action of trespass continued to be regarded as extraordinary,
and was used rather infrequently for a century or so after its first ap-
pearance in any form in the Year Books. In the Year Books of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries up to the death of Henry VII in 1509,
seventy-six separate cases are listed in the indices as action on the case .4
143. Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 11, pl. 48 (1400). The case of John Erich, Y. B.
Mich. 34 Hen. VI, f. 4, pl. 11 (1455), was an accion sur son cas for a disturbance of the
plaintiff's way. "Billing. Again judgment of the writ, for he has supposed a trespass
done to his free tenement, which is in the nature of a writ of trespass, and yet he has
not said in the writ vi et armis, etc." See Browne v. Hawkins, Y. B. Trin. 17 Edw. IV,
f. 3, pl. 2 (1477); Y. B. Trin. 13 Hen. VII, f. 26, pl. 4 (1498).
144. See note 115, supra.
145. The space given to accions sur le cas in the Year Book indices increases with
each successive reign, but not necessarily because there were more cases. The Year
Book editors began including in the index of the later Year Books two, three, or often
more, references to tile same case. This has misled modern writers into believing that
case had early become "one of the most frequently used of all common-law remedies."
3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 252.
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At least two others, and probably more, were marked by a marginal
note but not listed in the index under case. Of the seventy-six, however,
there are only thirty-five which from the Year Book report can be
definitely and accurately called examples "of trespass on the case. Of the
remainder, one case was dearly an action of trespass, and four more
were on the* borderline between trespass and case. Twenty-nine were
dicta concerning the scope or applicability of the special action of tres-
pass which occurred in the report of some different type of action. Of
actions for deceit there were three; three more were complaints by bill.
of some form or other, and the remaining one was an action which can-
not be identified from the brief note in the Year Book.
From these figures it is clear that in the fifteenth century the action
of trespass on the case was not the popular action it later became. A
detailed study of several plea rolls of the reigni of Edward IV (1460-
83) indicates that examples of the action of trespass on the case were
very rare in the early plea rolls, perhaps proportionately even rarer than
in the Year Books.14 Thus, the extraordinary character of the special
writ of trespass is shown by the comparative rarity of the action through
much of the Year Book period.
Nor did justices and other legal men cease to regard the action of
"'special" trespass as unusual for generations after its initiation. In an
action sur son cas brought in 1504, the argument turned on whether
the plaintiff should have brought debt or detinue instead of his present
.action.'4T After declaring that the plaintiff should have brought an
action of debt, Kingsmill, J., said:
"Where a general action lies, there no special action upon the case
lies; as where an assize of nuisance lies, there an action upon the
case does not lie; wherefore here, etc. And for the nonfeasance of
a thing action upon the case lies, as where an attorney does not
execute his office, or a laborer does not do his service in manuring
or tilling my land; for by that I am damaged, and no general action
lies there."
A century later, in the famous Slade's Case, the extraordinary char-
acter of the action was discussed. In this case, an action on the case
for assumpsit to recover money owing to the plaintiff from the bargain
146. See Neilson, Introduction, in Y. B. 10 Edw. IV & 49 Hen. VI. iS. S.] :'i--
xxvi. Actions on the case in some form seem to vary from fifteen to forty entries per
roll, out of a total of several thousand entries per roll, a very small proportion.
147. Y. B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, f. 8, pl. 18 (1504). The plaintiff brought his action
"to wit, that he bought of the defendant twenty quarters of malt to deliver on such a
day to the plaintiff, and that tile defendant had converted the said quarters to his own
use, whereby the action accrued to him."
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and sale of growing grain to the defendant, 14  Doderidge, for the de-
fendant, said: "He should not have an action on the case, which is an
extraordinary action and not limited within any certain form in the
Register . . . " To this the cburt replied, in giving judgment: "Action
on the case on assumpsit is a well formed action and contained in the
Register . . . " And then: "If a man has a manor within any honour
and has a leet within his manor of his tenants, if he or his tenants are
distrained by the lord of the honour to come to the leet of the honour,
he who is so distrained may have a general writ of trespass, or a special
writ upon his case . . . " and more in the same manner.
This persistent differentiation of the two actions of trespass as special
and general may indicate that the special form was not a new statutory
creation, but that it was an adaptation of the older and more usual action
of trespass vi et armis to meet a situation to which vi et arnzis, even in
its technical sense, would not apply because of the dissimilarity in the
operative facts. It suggests that the special action was the result of a
process of gradual evolution out of the old established form of the action
of trespass. The assumption of twentieth century writers who have be-
lieved that case was a new action created once and for all by the Chancery
acting under the powers granted by chapter 24 of the Statute of West-
minster II, is unsupported by the opinions of the legal profession during
the two centuries or more following the appearance of the special action
of trespass. These earlier lawyers never spoke of the action of trespass
on the case as a new kind of action, or as a statutory action, but only
as an extraordinary form of the common law action of general trespass,
adapted to a particular case to which, on account of its facts, the usual
form of the writ of trespass could not be made to apply.
148. 4 Co. 92b (1602). That the action of case was a special action was likewise
brought out in Isaack v. Clark, 2 Bulst. 309b (1615) (action of case for trover and con-
version).
1176 [Vol. 46 : 1142
